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2Abstract
Voluntary agreements with polluting industries are becoming a popular alternative to
traditional environmental regulation. One reason may be that voluntary agreements can
reduce compliance costs of polluting industries. In this paper we develop a family of
simple policy formulation and implementation models enabling us to formally
characterize the policy environments that make voluntary agreements possible. The
main message of this paper is one of caution. Voluntary agreements that increase
compliance costs and reduce social welfare can not be ruled out. The analyses also
suggests that giving the legislative branch of government an effective power of veto
reduces (but does not eliminate) the possibility of welfare reducing voluntary agree-
ments.
31. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to propose and analyse simple economic models describ-
ing the regulatory policy approach known as voluntary agreements.  
The term voluntary agreements attempts to capture the idea that environmental goals
and/or instruments of implementation are negotiated with the firms to be regulated
prior to implementation or at least that there is some freedom of choice (for the
regulated firms) with respect to which regulatory scheme a firm is to be submitted.
Before defining the concept more precisely we will discuss the related concept
voluntary regulatory instruments.
 The term voluntary regulatory instruments (or voluntary approaches) is used to
characterize a wide range of informational and motivational policy instruments which
can be divided into three main groups: voluntary instruments that do not involve the
public directly, so-called voluntary instruments involving the public and so-called
voluntary instruments allowing firms some spectrum of choice as to which regulatory
scheme they are to be submitted (see IEA (1995) for an international review of existing
schemes for energy efficiency).
Voluntary regulatory instruments that do not involve the public directly include
energy auditing schemes, promotion of energy savings, promotion of technologies,
golden carrot programmes (e.g. subsidizing development and implementation of energy
saving products and technologies) and other 'soft' policy instruments. These
programmes can be understood as subsidizing development or supply of preferred
technologies and subsidies for provision of certain types of costly information to firms.
The industry’s reactions caused by such schemes are no more voluntary than those
caused by taxes or other incentive-based regulatory instruments. However, subsidy
based instruments have non-negative net income effects for polluting firms, implying
that the regulator de facto accepts that firms have the right to pollute. Since polluting
firms then have no reason to oppose implementation of such policies they may be said
to be more voluntary for firms in this respect.
Another class of voluntary regulatory instruments focuses on channeling credible
information on firms’ environmental performance to the general public (e.g. US EPA's
33/50 program, UK and New Zealand 'corporate commitment' schemes). Economically
these schemes are subsidies for provision of credible information bringing
environmental performance of firms into the competitive fringe. An environmental
dimension is added to firm products which, depending on the weight potential buyers
attach to it, may induce better environmental performance by firms. These schemes are
formally voluntary, but the ensuing competition among firms may well reduce the
average profitability in the sector in question (see Arora and Cason (1995) and Arora
and Gangopadhyay (1994) for theoretical and empirical analysis of such schemes). 
Finally, the term 'voluntary instruments' is also used for advanced versions of 'hard'
regulatory instruments that e.g. specify that a firm may be exempt from standard
regulation if it agrees to undertake alternative measures to achieve the same goals.
4These are sophisticated regulatory instruments where firms implicitly reveal private
information to the regulator by choosing from a menu of regulatory contracts. If
designed correctly regulatory schemes offering firms a choice of different regulatory
contracts rather than just imposing one uniform contract on all firms may increase
regulatory efficiency (see e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993) for an exposition of applica-
tions of contract theory to regulatory economics).
In this paper we will not consider the voluntary regulatory instruments. Instead we
will understand the term voluntary agreements as characterizing another way of
structuring the process, through which environmental goals are formulated and
instruments of implementation are decided on. In other words the voluntary agreement
process is one way to organize the game of policy formulation, while the 'traditional
policy formulation process' is another.  
The outcome of a voluntary agreement process can in principle be the same environ-
mental goals implemented through the same regulatory instruments as would have
been the outcome of a traditional policy formulation process. However, if the volun-
tary agreement process is substantially different one would expect a different policy
outcome and thus different distributional and social welfare effects.
In the next section I discuss the voluntary agreement process and the traditional
policy formulation process and propose three central differences. In the following
sections I propose and analyse formal models incorporating these differences. The
analysis indicates under which conditions voluntary agreements may occur and which
changes in distributional and social welfare effects the resulting environmental
regulation may cause.
The approach used in this paper is traditional neoclassic economic analysis. We
assume fixed preferences for all agents and that utility is derived from end states only.
It is worth noting that when considering alternative negotiation and decision-making
processes these assumptions may be critical. It can be argued that preference learning
and utility derived from a participatory process are central aspects of voluntary
agreements. Through the process firms may learn that they have greater preference for
environmental improvement than they were aware of before and firms may be willing
to pay for the opportunity of a participatory process by accepting end states that are
considered less desirable in themselves. 
52. Characteristics Distinguishing Policy Formulation through Voluntary Agree-
ment from the Traditional Policy Formulation Process 
Describing the interaction between political players during the policy formulation and
implementation process is the subject of much of the political science literature and a
growing body of economic literature on public choice and agency capture. In the
following I propose a simplistic description of the traditional policy process and the
voluntary agreement process based on empirical surveys (e.g. IEA (1995), Glachant
(1994)) which point to the key differences to be modelled in the following sections.
The traditional process consists of legislation on regulatory instruments where
implementation and administration of these instruments are delegated to a regulatory
agency. While environmental policy goals may be contested and subject to negotiation
the real battle is over legislation on regulatory instruments. These usually require a
legislative process with direct participation of the executive branch of Government
(hereafter just called Government) and the legislative bodies of Government (hereafter
called Congress). Affected industrial organizations and other interest groups are
normally consulted by Government as well as Congress and may indirectly influence
the process. 
Voluntary agreements generally only have Government agencies and individual
firms or industrial organizations (hereafter also denoted IOs) as direct participants.
Normally, agreements do not result in legislation. Firms or IOs commit to targets and
monitoring procedures, but not necessarily to specific instruments or methods of
implementation. Normally, no formal sanctions for non-attention of targets are
specified.
One apparent difference between the two policy formulation processes is that
Congress participates directly in the traditional process, but is excluded from direct
participation in the voluntary process. Instead  IOs are elevated to a role as direct
participants. Clearly, other (e.g. environmental) interest groups (hereafter also denoted
IGs) and Congress may still indirectly influence the voluntary policy process.
When considering voluntary agreements with industrial organizations (on which we
will focus in the following) another novelty is that implementation of environmental
goals or agreed on instruments is left to the industrial organizations rather than to
public agencies. This can be seen as a necessary consequence of not involving
Congress directly since implementation by traditional regulatory instruments through
Government agencies normally would require passing of legislation. Though
regulatory agencies may still have a role as monitors of the agreed targets
Governments must contract with industrial organizations for implementation. Thus the
responsibility for and practical implementation of regulatory instruments are shifted to
industrial organizations - often the choice of instruments of implementation is left to
the Ios, too. The reward to IOs for implementing environmental targets is usually
implicit in the agreement. One possibility is that Government promises not to push for
legislation implementing some kind of traditional regulation if targets are met. Though
6IOs may be able to implement effective regulatory instruments vis-à-vis member firms
the issue of credibility of Government threats/promises and IO compliance with the
negotiated targets is relevant.
Just as implementation through IOs is a logical consequence of excluding Congress
from direct participation so is the voluntary agreement process what makes
implementation through IOs possible. If IOs are to take responsibility for implementa-
tion Government must of course negotiate an agreement with them. Thus the aim of
Governments engaging in a voluntary agreement process need not be the exclusion of
Congress, but may instead be to shift the responsibility of implementation to IOs
(possibly with the full support of Congress). 
In conclusion voluntary agreements can be seen as a policy process with three
central characteristics:
1)Congress is no longer a direct participant in the policy formulation process - instead
firms or IOs become direct participants.
2)Responsibility for implementation of regulation is shifted to industrial organizations
3)Statutory sanctions ensuring IO participation and compliance are not possible under
voluntary agreements. Instead IOs must be induced to comply through e.g. threats of
new regulation in the area covered by the agreement. The question of what
government credibly can threaten to do arises. 
The presumption in the following is that Government or opposition parties are able to
initiate the traditional policy formulation process (involving Congress) in any area of
regulation, but that once the process is started it can only to some extent influence the
end result. Government is also able to block initiation of the traditional policy
formulation process by opposition parties by entering into a voluntary agreement. In
other words Government may choose between entering into a voluntary agreement or
initiating a legislative process.
 To resolve the credibility-compliance issue we will assume that Government threats
of imposing punishment (i.e. pushing for legislation or harsher administration of
existing legislation) which also reduces the utility of Government are not credible. In
other words the only credible Government threat is that of utility maximizing
behaviour given that no agreement is made (i.e. Government cannot expropriate utility
from firms by threatening death and destruction). To induce firms to comply with the
conditions of a voluntary agreement Government must allot firms at least the same
utility that they would have had if Government maximized its utility without a
voluntary agreement. We thus assume that there must be mutual gains to trade for an
agreement to be made which then also insures firm and Government compliance.
In the next three sections we consider voluntary agreements with industrial
organizations. In section 3 we develop a model without interest group signalling power
focusing on differences in policy goals between Congress and Government. In sections
4 and 5 models with interest group signalling power focusing on the shift of
Uf ' &T & C
Uc ' Uf % 8cT % *cR
Ug ' Uf % 8gT % *gR
8c > 0, 8g > 0, *c > 0, *g > 0
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responsibility for goal formulation and for implementation are developed and in
section 6 conclusions are drawn. 
3. Voluntary Agreements when Interest Groups do not have Signalling Power 
In this section we specify a model without interest group influence through public
criticism and find necessary conditions for use of voluntary agreements. These
conditions allow us to characterize the possible environmental and welfare effects of
voluntary agreements.
The model has three active agents: the IO representing polluting firms (hereafter
also just called the firm), the Government and the Congress.  Government may initiate
the traditional policy formulation process through Congress or enter a voluntary
agreement process with the IO. 
Both policy formulation processes result in the setting of an environmental goal
denoted R (indicating amount by which environmental damage is to be reduced) and a
tax revenue goal T (indicating the amount of revenue to be collected through
regulatory instruments). Implementation of these goals through the available 
regulation technology results in firm compliance costs denoted C in addition to the tax
revenue payment. 
Let U  denote the utility effect on the firm of regulation and define:f
Government and Congress are both assumed to take into account the utility effects of
regulation on the firm, the environmentally concerned part of the public and the part of
the public that might benefit from increased tax revenues. However, they may differ in
the relative weights attached to these groups in their respective utility function. Let Uc
and U  denote the utility effects of regulation on Congress and Governmentg
respectively and define:
where 8 and 8  are the utility weights attached to tax revenue by Congress andc    g
Government respectively, *  and *  are the utility weights attached to environmentalc  g
damage reduction. We make the natural assumptions .
Max
R,T Uc
under C ' C(R,T)
U (f ' &T
( & C(R (, T ()
CR > 0, CRR > 0
8
(1)
The negotiation process between Government and Congress under the traditional
policy formulation process is not modelled explicitly. Instead the utility function of
Congress should be interpreted as representing the result of this process incorporating
the relative power of Government and opposition parties in Congress. If Government’s
utility function parameters are equal to the parameters of Congress’ utility function this
implies agreement between Government and opposition parties or a large relative
Governmental negotiation power while unequal parameters indicate disagreement and
low Government party negotiation power in Congress.
The traditional policy process sets goals that are implemented through traditional
Government policy instruments. Let C(R, T) describe the firm compliance costs that
result when goals are implemented through the available regulation technology. We
assume (i.e. positive and rising marginal compliance cost of
damage reduction) and C  $ 0, C  $0 (i.e. non-negative and non-falling dead-weightT   TT
loss of tax revenue collection). Underlying the dead-weight loss assumptions is an
assumption that tax revenue (e.g. from environmental tax) can be redistributed to
polluting firms through a cost less lump sum scheme. Thus we assume that increasing
revenue is possible without dead-weight loss up to the level of revenue implemented
by a perfect emission tax and that if revenue increases above this level it results in
dead-weight loss. Correspondingly, we assume that C # 0 (i.e. that marginalRT 
compliance costs are non-increasing in collected revenue). Note that the compliance
cost function allows for the possibility that firms as a group derive benefit from
environmental damage reduction (e.g. cost reducing effects of reduced environmental
damage).
Thus the traditional policy formulation process is assumed to be described by the
following maximization problem: 
the solution to which is denoted  R  andT  .*  *
Agent utilities with the traditional regulation process become:
U (c ' U
(
f % 8c T
( % *cR
(
U (g ' U
(
f % 8g T
( % *gR
(
CR ' *c
CT ' 8c & 1
U˜f ' &C(cR˜, 0)
U˜c ' U˜f % *cR˜
U˜g ' U˜f % *gR˜
R˜, T˜
T˜ ' 0
9
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
The first order conditions from step 1 imply
and
In the voluntary agreement process goalsare set through negotiations between
Government and the IO and then implemented by the IO. Thus the industrial
organization representing firms is assumed to have a regulatory technology vis-à-vis its
members with which it can ensure attainment of the environmental goals. Clearly,
public tax revenues are not generated (i.e.). We further assume that the
regulatory technology is described by the functions C (cR, T) where T = 0. Thus by
assumptions the two regulatory technologies are identical save for the cost parameter c
and the constraint that T = 0 under IO implementation. This simplifies the following
derivations while capturing the essential difference in relative implementation
efficiency through a single parameter c, indicating the relative cost of IO-
implementation.
Agent utilities under the voluntary agreement process become:
U˜f ' &C(cR˜, 0) $ &T
( & C(R (, T () ' U (f
U˜g ' U˜f % *gR˜ $ U
(
f % 8gT
( % *gR
( ' U (g
8g '
R˜ & R (
T (
*g %
(U˜f & U
(
f )
T (
*g ' CRc
R˜
R˜
R˜ U˜g
R˜ U˜g
R˜ U˜g
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(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
If the agents’ utility functions, the C function, the c parameter are public information
the result of the traditional policy process R ,T  can be predicted by Government as* *
well as the firm. Given this, a necessary condition for a voluntary agreement is that
both parties to the agreement experience a non-negative utility gain vis-à-vis the
traditional policy process which both parties know is the alternative. In other words a
non-empty set of goals () must exist for which both the following individual
rationality constraints are satisfied:    
IR-firm:
IR-Government:
In the following we wish to find the set of parameter tuples (* , 8 ) that for a giveng  g
tuple of parameter (*  ,8  , c) allows a non-empty set of  () satisfying both IRc  c
constraints. In other words we wish to characterize the set of parameter tuples (* , 8 )g  g
that makes voluntary agreements possible (hereafter called the VA-set).
On the border of the VA-set one or both IR constraints are satisfied with equality.
For sufficiently small *  the that maximizes Government utility will be smallg
enough so that firm utility is not exhausted (i.e. the firm IR constraint is not binding).
In this area the relationship between 8  and * at the set border must satisfy (10) withg  g
equality and is set to maximize . The equation characterizing the relationship
between 8 , and *  on the part of the set border where the firm constraint is not bindingg   g
becomes:
where is set to maximize so that the following 1. order condition (derived
from  (8)) holds:
8g '
R˜ & R (
T (
*g
R˜ ' C &1([T ( % C(R (, T ()], 0)/c
T (d8g % R
(d*g ' &CRc
dR˜
d*g
d*g % R˜d*g % *g
dR˜
d*g
d*g
d8g
d*g
'
R˜ & R (
T (
U˜g R˜
R˜
R˜
R˜ U˜g CRc ' *g
R˜ U˜g dR˜/d*g > 0
R˜ ' R (
CR(R
(,T () ' *c CR(cR˜,0)c ' *g
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(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
As *  increases the -maximizing rises and at some point firm utility isg
exhausted and both constraints must be satisfied. Using (9) on (11) we find the
equation characterizing the relationship between 8 , and *  on the part of the set borderg   g
where both Government and firm constraints are binding to be:
with (rearranging (9)):
The VA-set Border 
As noted, when *  is sufficiently small  the firm constraint does not bind andg
the exhausting firm utility is deemed too high by Government so that
reducing increases utility of both agents. In this area only the IR Government
constraint (11) binds. Total differentiation of (11) with respect to * and 8  givesg  g
Since is set to maximize we have so that (15) reduces to:
Since is set to maximize we know that so  that (11) is a convex
curve initially (for small * ) downward sloping in the *  -8 -plane. It then attains ag      g g
minimum when and slopes up again.
It is apparent that (* , 8 ) is not in the VA-set when c>1. From (4) we knowc  c
that and from (12) we know that so that for * =c*g c
we have:
CR(R
(,T () ' CR(cR˜,0)
*g ' c*c Y cR˜ < R
(
*g
*c *g ' *c R˜ > R
(
*g *c R˜ < R
( *g ' *c
R˜
R˜
(R˜ & R ()/T (
R˜ < R (
R˜ > R (
(*c,8c)
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(17)
(18)
and by C<0 and C>0 we have:RT   RR
This implies that when c is close to 1 (11) has its minimum at avalue
below and that for we have .  However, if  c is large enough
(11) has its minimum at avalue above and then  for .
Now consider the part of the set border where both IR constraints bind satisfying
(13) and (14). Note that equation (14) implies that there is a uniquefor which
compliance costs under the voluntary agreement technology just exhaust the gain from
not having to pay taxes T  and abating to R  under the traditional regulatory*    *
technology. Thusonly depends on the firm’s alternative income and is thus
independent of Government utility function parameter *  and 8  .We see from (13) thatg  g
the set border here is a line through origo with slope: .
From (13) and (16) we see that for all border tuples where the associated border
slope is negative the corresponding voluntary agreement is characterised
by and for tuples with a positive associated slope the corresponding
voluntary agreement is characterised by.
The above observations allow us to illustrate the set border. In figure 1 three 
possible set borders are illustrated for c>1 (i.e. no compliance cost advantage).The part
of the parameter space in which voluntary agreements are possible is  the part of the *g
- 8  plane below the set border. We know that when c>1 the set defined by the borderg
does not include and that the boarder for small *  (where the firm constraintg
does not bind) is negatively sloped and convex. When c is clos  to one the boarder
may attain its minimum (marked by a square) before the firm constraint binds and at a
*  below *  (as in the highest placed of the three illustrated border lines).When c isg  c
large the boarder equation has no minimum (as in the lowest of the three illustrated
border lines) or attains its minimum for a *  above *  (as in the middle border line).g  c
Fig. 1
(U˜f & U
0
f )
"(U˜g & U
0
g )
(1&")
U 0f , U
0
g
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(19)
The VA-set Interior: Nash Bargaining Solutions
In this subsection we apply the Nash bargaining solution to the negotiation problem
presented above thus allowing us to characterize the result of the voluntary agreement
process in the interior of the VA-set where the set of feasible agreements is not a
singleton (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a presentation of and references
to the literature on bargaining models and their applications).
The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is the agreement that maximizes the Nash
product:
where are appropriate alternative benefits to the parties and " is a parameter
that can be loosely interpreted as expressing relative bargaining power of the two
agents.
Initially we briefly review two specifications of the underlying dynamic negotiation
game that implement the Nash bargaining solution and important implications for
specification and interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution that were pointed out
by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). 
(U˜f & U
(
f )
"(U˜g & U
(
g )
(1&")
1) Introducing differences in risk aversion into the model can be done by letting firm
utility be a convex function of monetary costs. This complicates derivation somewhat, but
does not essentially change the model.  
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(20)
The underlying bargaining process is in both cases assumed to be a game of
alternating offers. For such a game to have a unique solution agents must experience
costs in connection with continuation of the bargaining process. Binmore et al. po t
out that such a game may be driven by impatience or by risk and in both cases result in
implementation of the Nash bargaining solution when the cost per negotiation step
goes to zero. In the first case the dominant cost of bargaining is the delay of payoff
that continued negotiation causes. If agents are impatient to reap the rewards of a
bargain each new bargaining step entails a cost in that it postpones the payoff entailed
by an agreement. In this case agent utility functions reflect time preferences, and the
relevant alternative benefits are the benefits accruing to agents during the bargaining
process. In the second case the dominant cost associated with bargaining is not the
delay of payoff caused, but that continued negotiation encompasses an external risk of
losing the bargain opportunity altogether (the preposition <external’ i dicates that the
risk is uncontrolled by the negotiating parties). Each new bargaining step entails a cost
in prolonging the period that the agents are subject to the external risk of losing the
opportunity of payoff  though an agreement - a risk that can only be eliminated by
entering into an agreement. In this case the agent utility functions reflect risk aversion
and the relevant alternative benefits are the benefits that agents would attain if the
opportunity of an agreement were to be lost (and not the benefits actually accruing
during negotiation).
Here the exogenous risk model seems an obvious choice for the underlying
negotiation game for two reasons: 1) there is a risk that the traditional legislative
process may be initiated by opposition parties thus eliminating the opportunity of a
voluntary agreement, and 2) firms (that are net losers vis-à-vis the unregulated state in
either case) cannot as such be impatient for an agreement. This implies that the
relevant alternative benefit is the benefit expected to result from initiation of the
traditional legislative process (and not the benefits resulting from the current
unregulated situation as would be the case if the negotiation process were driven by
impatience). The thus specified Nash product is:
Specifying "=1/2 (the symmetric solution) is tempting since differences in risk
aversion are embedded in the utility functions and therefore cannot motivate use of an
asymmetric bargaining solution (in our case both agents have linear (i.e. risk neutral)
utility functions. The asymmetric bargaining solution can, however, be motivated by1
differences in the perception of the exogenous risk of break down of negotiations (i.e.
"(U˜f & U
(
f )
("&1)
dU˜f
dR˜
(U˜g & U
(
g )
(1&") %
(U˜f & U
(
f )
"(" & 1)(U˜g & U
(
g )
&"
dU˜g
dR˜
' 0
(U˜g & U
(
g ) ' (U˜f & U
(
f )
(1&")
"
(dU˜g /dR˜)
&(dU˜f /dR˜)
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(21)
differences in the perception of the risk of opposition parties initiating the traditional
policy process) or by asymmetries in the bargaining process itself (e.g. the time
allotted for responding to offers etc.) both of which seem plausible in our case. In the
following we therefore uphold the general asymmetric specification. 
The first order condition for maximising (20) with respect tois:
which reduces to: 
Inserting the definitions of  we have:
The equation defines as a function of model parameters and for fixed it
defines the equation for isoquants (iso-curves) in the (*  8  ) plane of figure 1. g  g
For (where ) isoquants are straight lines with a negative slope.
As grows isoquant slopes grow and become positive  if when 
. Note also that if  " increases isoquants move to the right in the graf and
their slope increases (i.e. for any given (*   8  ) parameter set increased firm bargainingg  g
power reduces in the resulting voluntary agreement which is in accordance with
intuition). In figure 2 one of the VA-sets from figure 1 is reproduced with its
associated interior isoquants indicating the resulting for he entire VA-set.
FIGURE 2 Illustration characterising the VA-set for a model without interest group
signalling power

SW(R,T) ' Uf(R,T) % 8cT % *cR
SW(R˜,0) & SW(R (,T ( ) 'U˜f& U
(
f & 8cT % *c(R˜ & R
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Realisation of Voluntary Agreements and their Distributional and Welfare Effects 
We now specify the social welfare function with which to evaluate the result of the
voluntary agreement process. Clearly at any given time different political parties and
the different branches of government may be biased towards special interest groups (be
this because of lobbyism or because of fundamental bias). Though by no means perfect
the division of power between executive and legislative braches of government and the
possibility of public scrutiny and debate under the traditional legislative process in a
democracy is often cited as important for balancing off special interest groups and thus
securing some adherence to the interests of the general public during the policy
formulation process. If these elements are important it seems likely that the policy
priorities implied by the congressional utility function (embedding compromises
between different parties and branches of government through such a legislative
process) in general will deviate less from those implied by the <true’ social welfare
function than will the policy priorities implied by the government utility function.
Taking this outset we will assume that the congressional utility function under the
traditional policy formulation process is the best estimator of the social welfare
changes caused by changes in goal attainment, i.e.  we specify the following social
welfare function:
giving the following social welfare effect of allowing a policy formulation through
voluntary agreements:
U˜c & U
(
c ' U˜f& U
(
f & 8cT % *c(R˜ & R
()
U˜g & U
(
g ' U˜f& U
(
f & 8gT % *g(R˜ & R
()
*g  *c 8g  8c
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(24)
Subtracting equation (2) from equation (7) we get the utility effect of voluntary
agreements for Congress:
 and for Government (equation (8) minus equation (3)):
We see that in this model the social welfare effect of a voluntary agreement is equal to
the effect on congressional utility.
Figure 2 illustrates that if Government and Congress disagree on policy priorities
(i.e. if or if ) voluntary agreements become possible even though
they imply a fall in implementation efficiency (i.e. c>1). If Government is sufficiently
more pro-firm than Congress then firms as well as Government gain from reducing
environmental goals and tax revenue below the level that would result from the
traditional policy formulation process involving Congress even though implementation
efficiency falls.
If Government is sufficiently more pro-environment (relative to revenue) than
Congress then it becomes possible for Government to offer a mutually advantageous
reduction in tax revenue in return for an increase in environmental performance even
though implementation efficiency falls. In both cases firms and Government gain
utility (a necessary condition for a voluntary agreement) while the utility of Congress
is necessarily reduced (since deviating from congressional policy priorities is the only
possible generator of utility gains for firms and Government when implementation
efficiency falls). The utility of the environmental interest group may be reduced or
increased as indicated in figure 2.
If on the other hand implementation efficiency increases sufficiently (i.e. c<1) the
VA-set boundary shifts up and voluntary agreements become possible when
Government and Congress agree on policy priorities. In this case Congress and the
environmental interest group as well as firms and Government gain utility. However, if
Government and Congress disagree on policy priorities, the resulting voluntary
agreement may reduce congressional utility (and social welfare) and/or environmental
performance even though it increases implementation efficiency.
The distributional and welfare consequences of voluntary agreements can be
summarised as follows:
18
Effect of
voluntary
agreements on:
Falling implementation Rising implementation
efficiency efficiency
Government Government Government Government
and Congress and Congress and Congress and Congress
have same have different have same have different
policy priorities* policy priorities policy priorities policy priorities
– Firm utility + + +
– Government + + +
– Congress - + ?
– Environment ? + ?
– Tax Revenue - - -
– Social welfare - + ?
* Voluntary Agreements are not possible
Voluntary agreements become possible when they encompass implementation
efficiency gains or when Congress and Government disagree on policy priorities. If
Congress and Government agree on policy priorities only agreements that imply
increased implementation efficiency and a social welfare gain will be realised. If
agreement on policy priorities can be insured then allowing policy formulation through
voluntary agreements entails a clear cut welfare gain. However, if Congress and
Government disagree on policy priorities this may reduce or eliminate the welfare
gains associated with lower compliance costs. Further, if policy disagreement is large
enough, voluntary agreements become possible even though implementation efficiency
is reduced.
The potential welfare problem for voluntary agreements in this model arises because
Government is allowed to enter voluntary agreements that reduce congressional utility.
Within the model set up the obvious solution is to give Congress the right to veto
voluntary agreements. This would restrict the VA-set to agreements that also satisfy
the congressional utility constraint (i.e. to agreements that are welfare improving). 
4. Voluntary Agreements when the Firm’s Interest Group has Signalling Power 
The following is an augmentation of the model in the previous section incorporating
direct influence of interest groups in a very simple way. We assume that interest
groups may reward/punish those responsible for a decision or a policy result by
publicly applauding or criticizing the decision or result. Utility of political actors is
affected directly because the general public’s perception of them is influenced by
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interest group criticism. 
In the following we assume that this process takes on a very simple structure. We
assume that an IG can only credibly criticize observed decisions or results as such and
that the criticism then will be perceived by the public as applying to all agents
responsible for the decision or result. Thus the IG may vary the intensity of criticism,
but is not able to influence the relative utility effect on the different actors responsible
for the decision or result being criticized. In effect then IG-criticism is a public
good/bad for the group of actors responsible for a decision. Further activities of IGs
are assumed to be embedded in a larger environment of repeated policy formulation
and criticism. We assume that to be effective IGs must have a predictable and
consistent pattern of response to policy across different policy settings and that this
pattern is a strategy set by each IG outside the model. We further assume that the costs
of deviating from the pre-set pattern are so large as to make this a non-viable option in
the given case (i.e. that deviation if discovered by the public would result in a general
and very costly loss of credibility). Basically we assume that IG criticism in order to
be credible must be a trustworthy signal that the public can translate into an indicator
of damage done to the interest group by policy. 
The public’s punishment decision problem is also assumed to be embedded in a
larger environment of repeated decisions and criticism with periodic public punishment
of decision makers (through, e.g. voting at elections or product buying decisions).
Punishment must be based on an accumulated measure of decision maker performance.
The punishment effectuated by the public may be a non-linear function of the
aggregate performance measure which again may be a non-linear function of the
damage signals from interest groups. However, if we assume that the decision problem
at hand is small it may be reasonable to model the marginal effects of an interest
group’s signal on public punishment as linear functions of the damage caused to the
interest group. 
With this rationale we will model the effect of an IG's criticism on a decision
maker’s utility as a linear function of damage done to the interest group. The
coefficient being the marginal weight the public attaches to interest group damage in
the performance indicator times the marginal disposition to punish times the marginal
utility effect of punishment on the decision makers utility - all of which are assumed to
be constant over the spectrum covered by the 'small' regulation problem at hand. 
Augmenting the previous model we have the following agent utilities under the
traditional policy process:
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and under the voluntary agreement process:
where and are the marginal utility effects of environmental interest group
criticism on the firm, Congress and Government respectively andand are the
marginal utility effects of firm interest group criticism.and are the levels of
environmental damage reduction and firm utility where interest group criticism
switches from having a negative to having a positive net utility effect.
In the traditional process Government and Congress are responsible and thus
affected by criticism/applause from the environmental and firm interest group. In the
voluntary agreement process Congress is not responsible and therefore unaffected
while the firm now is affected by environmental IG criticism. Taking responsibility for
the decision the firm IG can no longer criticize the decision so this element is
eliminated from Government utility. 
Deriving the voluntary agreement set border as in the previous section the equation
describing the firm unconstrained part of the border (corresponding to equation (11)) is
while the firm constrained part is described by the following equations (corresponding
to (13) and 17))
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(34)
and
The equation for the isoquant curves that characterize the VA-set interior
corresponding to equation (21) becomes:
In the special case where only the firm IG has signalling power
(i.e. ) we see that the set border here is equal to the set border in
the previous section except for the presumably positive constant .
Thus the effect of firm IG signalling power corresponds to an upward shift of the set
border and iso-quant equation from the previous section. This is illustrated in figure 3.
FIGURE 3 Illustration characterising the VA-set for a model with firm interest group
signalling power
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We now specify a social welfare function with wich to evaluate the result of the
voluntary agreement process. The two characteristics of the traditional policy
formulation process that we have cited as central for balancing off special interest
groups are the division of power and the possibility of public scrutiny. As in the
previous section interest groups may subtly affect policy priorities through lobbyism or
political agents may be fundamentally biased. Thus we will assume that the importance
of division of power justifies using the congressional utility function as a starting point
for specifying a social welfare function. In this model, however, the firm interest group
also sends a credible signal to the public that allows direct public disciplining of
decision makers. This accentuates the potential importance of public scrutiny. Based
on this we will assume that public disciplining resulting from firm IG signalling in
general brings the resulting policy decisions closer to the socially optimal. This in turn
allows us to assume that the congressional utility function under the traditional policy
formulation process is the best estimator of the social welfare changes caused by
changes in goal attainment giving the following social welfare function:
and the following social welfare effect of voluntary agreements:
The effect of voluntary agreements on congressional utility (equation (29) minus
equation (26)) now becomes:
and the effect on Government utility (equation (30) minus equation (27)):
When comparing with the model in the previous section we see that voluntary
agreements give Congress an extra utility gain as a result of avoiding public criticism.
Thus the effect on congressional utility may differ from the effect on social welfare
(intuitively the utility gained by Congress when avoiding public criticism is as such
irrelevant for the general public). If Government and Congress agree on policy
s fc (U¯
f
& U˜f)>0
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priorities and have the same susceptibility to firm criticism the utility effects on
Government and Congress are the same.
The distributional and welfare effects of voluntary agreements are summarised
below:
Effect of
voluntary
agreements on:
Falling implementation Rising implementation
efficiency efficiency
Government Government Government Government
and Congress and Congress and Congress and Congress
have same have different have same have different
policy priorities policy priorities policy priorities policy priorities
– Firm utility + + + +
– Government + + + +
– Congress + ? + ?
– Environment ? ? ? ?
– Tax Revenue - - - -
– Social welfare - - ? ?
The main story here is concerned with welfare effects. When the firm IG has
signalling power Government may find it advantageous to enter agreements with firms
even when implementation efficiency falls and Government has the same policy
priorities and susceptibility to firm criticism as Congress. Driving such agreements is
the opportunity of avoiding firm IG criticism that otherwise would be initiated if policy
was formulated in the normal way. In exchange for this firms gain a reduction in taxes
and possibly a reduction in the severity of environmental goals relative to what would
be the result of the normal policy process. When Government and Congress share
policy priorities and susceptibility to firm criticism congressional utility will also
increase - however, social welfare is reduced.
Assuming as we have for Government that the net utility effect for Congress of firm
criticism is negative (i.e. )  any welfare increasing voluntary
agreement will also increase congressional utility (as easily seen by comparing (35)
and (36)). Thus the VA-set restriction that results when Congress is given the power to
veto voluntary agreements is still welfare increasing. However, a congressional right to
veto no longer assures that voluntary agreements will be welfare increasing.
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5. Voluntary Agreements when the Environmental Interest Group has Signalling 
Power
In this section we focus on environmental interest group signalling power, but in a
model allowing separation in time of goal formulation and implementation. This in
turn allows responsibility for goal setting to be decoupled from responsibility for
policy implementation. 
The idea is that it takes time for policy to work and more important that the results
of policy instruments cannot be predicted with certainty at the time of implementation.
This means that time elapses between  goal setting and observation of the result of
policy instruments implemented at the time of goal setting. The environmental interest
group may then criticize goal setting as well as goal attainment.
Let R  denote the goal set at the time of policy implementation and R the damageg
reduction attained after time has elapsed. Let the utility effect of environmental IG
criticism have the following structure:
1) at the time of goal setting the utility effect of criticism is:
2) at the time of goal attainment the utility effect of criticism is:
so that goal attainment criticism neutralizes applause of previous criticism of the
formulated goal and punishes the agent for non-attainment of the goal while not
rewarding for over-attainment. 
Defining DR  = R  - R agent utilities under the traditional policy process become:g  g
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Trivially .
Under the voluntary agreement process the Congress has no responsibility.
Government shares responsibility for goal formulation with the firm while
implementation is the sole responsibility of the firm. We then have
The equation characterizing the firm unconstrained part of the voluntary agreement  set
border (corresponding to equation (11)) becomes:
while the firm constrained part of the set border (corresponding to equation (13)) is
characterized by:
with (corresponding to equation (14)):
The equation for the isoquant curves that characterize the VA-set interior
corresponding to equation (21) becomes:
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Assume that s  = 0. We see that if  all equations are equal to the equationsf
e
in model I where *  is redefined as The possibility of decoupling goalg
setting and implementation responsibility (positive) shifts the boarder and iso-
quant curves upwards in the graph vis-à-vis the corresponding curves in section 3. As
 is reduced  rises in both parts of the curve and  eventually we have:
with
After this point we have
so when inserting (48) and (49) into (45) we have:
This means that any (* , 8 ) can be included in the set with a sufficiently smallg  g
(i.e. the upward shift of the curve is not bound). This situation is illustrated in figure 4.
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FIGURE 4 Illustration characterising the VA-set for a model with environmental
interest group signalling power
Based on the assumption that IG signalling generally brings the resulting policy
decisions closer to social optimum, we uphold the assumption that the congressional
utility function under the traditional policy formulation process is the best estimator of
the social welfare changes caused by changes in goal attainment. This gives the
following social welfare function:
and the following social welfare effect of voluntary agreements:
The effect of voluntary agreements on congressional utility is (equation (42) minus
equation (39)):
and the effect on Government utility is (equation (43) minus equation (40)): 
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2)The counter intuitive observation that increasing its power may hurt the environmental
interest group is also seen in other models of regulation with interest groups, e.g. Laffont
and Tirole (1993).     
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As in the previous section we see that voluntary agreements affect Congress by
eliminating public criticism from the environmental IG so that the effect on
congressional utility may differ from the effect on social welfare.  In contrast to what
was the case in the previous section if Government and Congress agree on policy
priorities and have the same susceptibility to environmental IG criticism the utility
effects on Government and Congress are not the same. The distributional and welfare
effects of voluntary agreements are summarised below:
Effect of
voluntary
agreements on:
Falling implementation Rising implementation
efficiency efficiency
Government Government Government Government
and Congress and Congress and Congress and Congress
have same have different have same have different
policy priorities policy priorities policy priorities policy priorities
– Firm utility + + + +
– Government + + + +
– Congress ? ? ? ?
– Environment ? ? ? ?
– Tax Revenue - - - -
– Social welfare - - ? ?
Further as environmental interest group signalling power increases (corresponding
to an upward shift of the VA-set in figure 4) we see that environmental performance
relative to the traditional policy process is reduced. Thus it is possible that an increase
in environmental interest group signalling power will harm the environment by
inducing a shift to policy formulation through voluntary agreements with a lower
absolute environmental performance.2
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The effect of agreements on congressional utility is unclear even if Government and
Congress share the same utility function. Congressional utility may increase as
Congress like Government avoids the effect of environmental interest group criticism
of goal achievement. However, unlike Government, Congress is excluded from the
(possibly positive) utility effect of applause of high goal setting so the net utility effect
for Congress may be negative.
Turning to social welfare effects we again find that when the environmental IG has
signalling power Government may find it advantageous to enter agreements even
though implementation efficiency is reduced and Government has the same policy
priorities and susceptibility to environmental IG criticism as Congress. By shifting
responsibility for implementation Governments avoid criticism for non-attainment of
goals - a criticism which firms may be less vulnerable to. Firms take responsibility and
endure the criticism of non-attainment while instead gaining the defacto acceptance by
Government of a reduction in the attained environmental goals.
Giving Congress the power to veto agreements is a somewhat more complicated
model change than in the previous models. Since giving Congress the right to veto also
moves Congress into the set of actors responsible for goal formulation Congress will
be affected by environmental IG signalling and the effect of a voluntary agreement on
congressional utility becomes:
As in the previous section any welfare increasing voluntary agreement will also
increase congressional utility. Thus giving Congress the power to veto voluntary
agreements is welfare increasing. However, we again see that giving Congress such a
power does not assure that voluntary agreements will increase social welfare.
6. Conclusion
This paper concerns the conditions under which voluntary agreements become possible
and their distributional and social welfare effects. The simple models developed here
focus on two aspects of voluntary agreements: the exclusion of legislative bodies from
the policy formulation process and the shift of responsibility for meeting
environmental goals and for policy implementation to industrial organisations . To
specify a social welfare function we assume that the balance of power between
legislative branches and the possibility of public scrutiny through a legislative process
are important for securing the interests of the general public during the policy
formulation process. This enables us to base specification of the social welfare
function on the congressional utility function. 
The models developed in the paper focus on the difference between political
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environments where interest groups can signal the utility effects of policy to the
general public and political environments where this is not possible. If interest groups
have little signalling power we find:
- that welfare reducing voluntary agreements are possible only when Government and
Congress disagree on policy objectives and  
- that giving Congress the power to veto voluntary agreements ensures that only
welfare increasing agreements are possible.
This is not surprising given that the social welfare function is based on the
congressional utility function.
However, in political environments where firm interest groups or environmental
interest groups have signalling power we find: 
- that welfare reducing voluntary agreements are possible even when Government and
Congress agree on policy objectives and 
- that giving Congress the power to veto voluntary agreements no longer ensures that 
agreements will be welfare increasing (although such a rule in it self is welfare
increasing).
This is surprising given that the social welfare function is based on the congressional
utility function. Further - counter to intuition - an increase in the environmental
interest groups signalling power may harm the environment by inducing a voluntary
agreement that reduces  environmental performance.
The balance of power between executive and legislative braches of Government and
the possibility of public scrutiny and debate under the legislative process are often
cited as important for securing some adherence to the interests of the general public
vis-à-vis special interest groups. If these characteristics are important, it seems likely
that a voluntary agreement process will tend to reduce adherence to the interests of the
general public by shifting the balance of power toward the executive branch of
Government and by shifting responsibility for policy goal implementation to firms thus
reducing the disciplining effect of public scrutiny and debate. While voluntary
agreements may be advantageous if compliance costs are reduced the message of the
paper is one of caution. Voluntary agreements may be possible when compliance costs
increase and may - even when compliance costs fall - be welfare reducing.
The theoretical models developed here are consistent with the hypothesis that
voluntary agreements may be part of a defensive strategy used by less environmentally
inclined industries and governments in the face of increasing public concern for the
environment. At any rate, the analyses here suggests that empirical research focussing
on the roles of different branches of government and the motivations of government
and industries for entering in to voluntary agreements is important and possibly
essential for uncovering the effects voluntary agreements.
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